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CONTRACTS-THE LIABILITY OF A BUILDING CONTRACTOR
FOR DEFECTS IN PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS
FURNISHED BY THE OWNER
The question of the liability of a contractor for structural fail-
ures or for failure to complete work as a result of defective plans
and specifications furnished by the owner is one that has received
quite varied treatment by the courts.
The early decisions followed the view that when a contractor
agreed to build or accomplish a given thing, he was liable if he failed
to build properly or to complete the work, regardless of any subse-
quent impossibility. The case which appears first to have adopted
this theory of strict liability was that of Paradine v. Jane.'
Somewhat later decisions reached the same result by holding that
when the contractor agreed to build according to plans and specifica-
tions furnished by the owner he impliedly warranted the sufficiency
of those plans and specifications and assumed any risk of impossi-
bility to comply therewith. He was held to the duty of inspecting
the plans and examining them as to their sufficiency before he ob-
ligated himself to perform and if he failed to do this he could not
offer ignorance of their insufficiency as a defense.2 In Lonergan v.
San Antonio L. & T. Co.,- the court held the contractor liable in dam-
ages where a building fell due to defects resulting from following
the plans furnished by the owner, saying, that if the contractors
were called upon to use their judgment and, " ... if they were not
competent to judge for themselves, it became their duty to protect
their interests by procuring such aid as was necessary to put them
in possession of the facts." The courts have justified this doctrine
"82 Eng. R. 897 (1647), where the court said: "... . but when the
party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself he is
bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by
inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by
his contract. And therefore if the lessee covenant to repair a house,
though it be burnt by lightning or thrown down by enemies, yet he
ought to repair it."
2 Superintendent & Trustees v. Bennett, 27 N. J. 513, 72 Am. Dec.
373 (1859); see Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500 (N. Y.), 32 Am. Dec.
518 at 519 (1838), which said: ". . . but if the covenant be within the
range of possibility, however absurd or improbable the idea of the
execution of it may be, it will be upheld: As where one covenants
it shall rain tomorrow, or that the Pope shall be at Westminster on
a certain day."
'101 Tex. 63, 104 S.W. 1061, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 364, 130 Am. St.
Rep. 803 (1907) Contra: Murphy v. Liberty Nat'l. Bank, 184 Pa. 208,
39 Atl. 143 (1898).
4 Lonergan v. San Antonio L. & T. Co., 101 Tex. 63, 104 S.W.
1061 at 1065, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 364 at 370, 130 Am. St. Rep. 803 at
813 (1907).
STUDENT NOTES
by reasoning that the contractor, who has experts in his employ,
whose duty it is to approve or disapprove plans and to determine
their sufficiency, should be in a better position than the owner to
determine whether or not the plans will obtain the result called for.'
Also, if the contractor holds himself out as having had a great
deal of experience, when in fact he has not, he is held liableY In
Clark v. Pope, the act of entering into the agreement was thought
by the court to be an implication by the contractor that he then
understood the plans and specifications and his defense that he did
not understand them when sued by the owner for breach of con-
tract was held untenable. When the impossibility was foreseeable
at the time the contract was made such impossibility could not be
pleaded as a defense or an excuse for non-performance
Within recent years the majority of the courts have held that
it is the owner who impliedly warrants the sufficiency of the plans
and specifications and not the contractor? In practically every
American jurisdiction where the question has come up for adjudica-
tion it has been held that the contractor is not liable for defects in
the plans furnished by the owner." As to producing a desired re-
sult by following the plans and specifications where the contract is
only to comply with such plans and specifications the contractor is
not liable if he fails to produce the desired result., However, where
the contractor has bound himself not only to follow the plans and
specifications but also to produce a specific result there is a difference
of opinion as to his liability for failing to produce the result by fol-
lowing the plans and specifications." With regard to the adaptation
of the plans to the site the recent cases hold that the owner, and not
the contractor, is assumed to have superior knowledge of the plans
if the conditions or defects are not apparent on the face of the con-
tract. "'
'See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Goss, 203 Fed. 904 at 911 (C.C.A. 8,
1913).
Id.
70 fI. 128 (1873).
'Lloyd v. Murphy, 66 Cal. App. 2d 1020, 153 P. 2d 47 (1944).
' Culbertson v. Ashland Cement & Const. Co., 144 Ky. 614, 139
S.W 792 (1911); Larson v. Tacoma School Dist., 143 Wash. 414, 255
Pac. 113 (1927); Bentley v. State, 73 Wis. 416, 41 N.W. 338 (1889), 88
A. L. R. 798 (1934).
1 'Note, 88 A. L. R. 798, 799 (1934).
1 See MacKnight Flintic Stone Co. v. New York, 160 N. Y. 72, 54
N. E. 661 at 663 (1899) ; Filbert v. Philadelphia, 181 Pa. 530, 37 Atl.
545 at 546 (1897).
Kuhs v. Flower City Tissue Mills Co., 104 Misc. 243, 171 N. Y. S.
688 (1918), Mod. 189 App. Div. 539, 179 N. Y. S. 450 (1919). Contra:
Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Turner Const. Co., 343 Pa. 512,
23 A. 2d 426 (1942).
'Hammaker v. Schleigh, 157 Md. 652, 147 Atl. 790 (1929); see
Faber v. City of New York, 222 N. Y. 255, 118 N. E. 609 at 610 (1918);
Walsh Const. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 271 Fed. 701 (E. D. Ohio
1920), Affd. 279 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 6, 1922).
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In those instances where the contractor, after beginning the
work or after partial completion has found that the plans and/or
specifications were insufficient the courts have allowed him to re-
ceive compensation in quantum meruit for any additional expense
if he has gone ahead with the owner's consent and done the work."
Where the contract provides, as some do, that necessary extra work
shall be done at the contractor's expense, this provision includes only
extra work that may be said to have been within the reasonable con-
templation of the parties at the time the contract was executed. The
contractor may recover reasonable compensation for other necessary
extra labor or materials.'
Thus we have seen the evolution from the doctrine of absolute
liability in the early law to the more liberal interpretation adopted
by practically every jurisdiction at the present time. It is the belief
of the writer that such evolution is in harmony with the spirit of
our modern law, and is justified by the present day practice of em-
ploying architects and other experts to prepare the plans and speci-
fications.
JAMES C. BROcK
" Montrose Contracting Co. v. Westchester, 80 F. 2d 841 (C. C. A.
2, 1936); Penn Bridge Co. v. New Orleans, 222 Fed. 737, 138 C. C. A.
191 (1915).
'" Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. 457, 462 et seq (C. C. A. 2,
1900).
